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The Metamorphosis
of the French Aphorism:
La Rochefoucauld and Nietzsche
MARION FABER

At first glance an attempt to relate the seventeenth-century
French aristocrat Due Fran~ois de Ia Rochefoucauld, darling of the
salon, to the late nineteenth-century German thinker and self-pro
claimed prophet Friedrich Nietzsche might seem almost absurd.
Yet these two men are in fact linked in literary history, both by
virtue of the documented influence of the one on the other and more
specifically for their use of a particular literary genre: the aphorism.
I hope in this essay to explore the impact that La Rochefoucauld's
work had on Nietzsche and Nietzsche's transformation of the French
aphorism as he found it in La Rochefoucauld into a structure uniquely
suited to his philosophical purposes, a structure that Sarah Kofman
could call "l'ecriture meme de Ia volonte de puissance." 1
The aphorism is a genre that goes back to classical times, Theognis,
Hippocrates, and Seneca being among its main practitioners. Despite
lexicographical distinctions among sentence, maxim, apothegm, and
aphorism, the form has been defined rather loosely; certainly Renais
sance scholars did not differentiate very strictly. 2 La Rochefoucauld,
the author of Reflexions diverses and Memoires, is known chiefly
for his Sentences et Maximes, the definitive edition of which was
published in 1678. It contains 519 aphorisms, or maxims, sometimes
grouped around certain key topics, but without any division into
sections or subgroupings. A work that gained immediate admiration
in its time and that was also held in high esteem in the eighteenth
century, the Sentences et Maximes were in Nietzsche's day generally
considered only a product of the salon and thus superficial, trivial,
and not worthy of the consideration of any serious student of
philosophy. But Nietzsche was one of La Rochefoucauld's chief
admirers in the nineteenth century and was largely responsible for a
renewed interest in him, an interest that the twentieth century has
sustained.
To assess La Rochefoucauld's effect on Nietzsche, I will focus on
one particular work by Nietzsche, Menschliches Allzumenschlz"ches.
Comparative Literature Studies
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Written between 1876 and 1878, this work marks a crucial turning
point in Nietzsche's career, a tum away from the romanticism of
Schopenhauer and Wagner. As we shall see, La Rochefoucauld's
work played a decisive role at this critical time in his life.
Until this point, the prodigious young professor of classical philol
ogy at the University of Basel had for years been very much under
the influence of Schopenhauer and Wagner, in both biographical and
philosophical senses. Since discovering the work of Schopenhauer in
his adolescence, Nietzsche had treasured that pessimistic philosophy
in an emotional way, identifying strongly with Schopenhauer's
persona as melancholy Einzelg(mger. In addition, Richard Wagner
had been Nietzsche's hero; Nietzsche had visited him regularly at his
home in Tribschen, forming a quasi-amorous attachment to Wagner's
wife Cosima, and seeing in Wagner a kind of ersatz father (Nietzsche's
own father had died when he was eight years old). This relationship
saw Nietzsche playing the son's role, however unconsciously, becom
ing a virtual disciple of The Great Man, and furthering Wagner's
artistic aims. To this end he changed Die Geburt der Tragodie aus
dem Geist der Musik, his first major work, to include a long section
hailing Wagner's operas as the long-awaited rebirth of Greek tragic
art.
But in 1876 Nietzsche broke with Wagner, again both on personal
and philosophical levels. After attending the Bayreuth Festival in
August 1876, he was no longer ready to stand like a factotum await
ing Wagner's commands. His own large ego could no longer tolerate
such a dependent, subservient position. He also came to see Wagner's
art, not as revolutionary, but as decadent, death-loving, life-denying
romanticism. After Bayreuth, contact between the two men was
never reestablished, and members of Wagner's circle considered
Menschliches Allzumenschliches, published in 1878, as no less than
a betrayal.
A new friend and new philosophical stimulant had entered the pic
ture in the person of Paul Ree, psychologist and the author of Psy
chologische Beobachtungen, which Nietzsche had read in Basel in
1873, the year of its publication. The German Jew and Nietzsche
entered into a friendship, which surely antagonized the anti-Semitic,
nationalistic Wagnerites and which meant a new, positivistic orienta
tion for Nietzsche.
It was at Ree's suggestion that Nietzsche began to read La Roche
foucauld, whom Ree admired enormously. In the fall of 1876, when
Nietzsche and Ree traveled to Sorrento, Nietzsche read La Roche
foucauld's Sentences et Maximes on the train. 3 In Sorrento, Nietzsche
and Ree lived at the villa of Malwida von Meysenbug, where they
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enjoyed long uninterrupted days of talking together and writing. It
was here that the first pages of MenschHches Allzumenschliches were
written. (These pages constitute the second section of the work; the
first section, metaphysical observations, had been written earlier and
was later incorporated as the first section of the completed work.)
In the first sections of his new work, the first work of his coming
of age as a philosopher, Nietzsche immediately credits La Rochefou
cauld with being his inspiration. Like the Frenchman, he too will
now try his hand at "Sentenzen-Schleiferei" (Aph. 35 ), and he
rebukes presentday readers who do not realize how difficult it is to
write within the constraints of this form. La Rochefoucauld and his
contemporaries are for Nietzsche "scharf zielende Schutzen, welche
immer und immer wieder ins Schwarze treffen-aber ins Schwarze
der menschlichen Natur" (Aph. 36). And indeed, Menschliches
Allzumenschliches is the first of Nietzsche's works written in the
aphoristic style, the style that he had admired in La Rochefoucauld
and that was to become inextricably associated with Nietzsche's
thinking.
Nowhere, then, is the influence of La Rochefoucauld as clear as
in this pivotal work of Nietzsche's, the most Gallic of all his writing.
Thus it is well suited for an examination of how Nietzsche trans
forms the French aphorism into his own vehicle. What about the
aphorism attracts him to it at this particular point in his life? What
does he do to change the aphorism to fit his own, unfettered philos
ophy of the forenoon?
Four main characteristics of La Rochefoucauld's work can, I
believe, explain Nietzsche's strong initial attraction to it:
First, and most obvious, the Maximes are a psychological work
par excellence. As Nietzsche stated in the quotation above, man's
nature is penetrated again and again by La Rochefoucauld's literary
arrows. The view of man is materialistic, a psychological investiga
tion of motivation and behavior. There are no metaphysical or reli
gious definitions of man (although in his posthumous aphorisms La
Rochefoucauld did concern himself with religion). Neither is the
heroic vision of man found in his contemporaries Racine and Comeille
asserted in the Maximes. This demystifying thrust corresponds well
to Nietzsche's intentions at this time.
Second, another obvious aspect of La Rochefoucauld's work is
that it is not systematic in any strict sense. Many of us who would
never think to make our way through seventeenth century French
essays have nevertheless browsed with pleasure through La Roche
foucauld, savoring provocations and putdowns, mulling them over,
and going on. True, there are groups of maxims more or less the-
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matically related, but one can turn to any page of La Rochefoucauld
and find several well-defined, autonomous nuggets of truth or bits
of thought for rumination.
The ideological consequence of such a form must, I believe,
also have been attractive to Nietzche, for an ostensibly casual collec
tion of truths corresponds exactly to Nietzsche's philosophical
position at this time. His idealistic predecessors in philosophy had
conceived the search for truth as the construction of a system for
explaining the world_ One cannot tum to any page in Kant or Hegel
and expect to find a self-sufficient thought, for all is conceived as a
great, interdependent system. Schopenhauer, although he was also a
consummate aphorist, is in his Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819)
the last of the systematic philosophers.
At this period in his career, Nietzsche was rejecting Schopenhauer
and with him the idea that there can be One Truth which is revealed
by one philosophy_ Now he is more concerned with the "kleinen
unscheinbaren Wahrheiten" (Aph. 3), scientific truths that can with
stand any disputing. In terms of metaphysical systems, Nietzsche is
nihilistic: the unsystematic form of the aphoristic work is perhaps
the only one truly able to reflect this anti-systematic ideology of the
Nietzsche of 1876. For him, it must have seemed the only honest
form for his philosophy.
Third, La Rochefoucauld's maxims are like the tip of an iceberg of
thought. As is well known, they are the result of countless rework
ings to achieve the greatest brevity and bite, shocking apen;:us which
leave the preliminary underpinnings of each thought unstated. This
aspect of the maxims must also have been attractive to Nietzsche the
artist, for unlike his philosophical predecessors, Nietzsche was not
only a philosopher, but a poet as well, and surely valued the aes
thetic satisfaction of a formulation no less than its content (given
that the two can be separated). His image of the cameo to describe
La Rochefoucauld's aphorisms (Aph. 35) indicates his aesthetic ori
entation, his assessment of the maxims as delicate and difficult works
of art. Thus he is drawn to La Rochefoucauld as much for the beauty
of his literary style as for his psychological acumen.
In addition to these three characteristics, there is a fourth aspect,
one related to the first: the moral focus of La Rochefoucauld's work.
He is a moraliste in the French sense, observing the mores of his soci
ety; but beyond that, he is a moralist in the English sense, analyzing
the moral structure of that society, its alleged virtues and vices.
Nietzsche, of course, is above all a moralist, a moralist of the indi
vidual, struggling already in this seminal work with the concepts of
good and evil as applied to man.
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To illustrate the evolution in the moral evaluations of the two
writers, their conclusions about the moral nature of man, I shall dis
cuss two pairs of aphorisms. The comparison also clarifies some
fundamental stylistic differences.
The first pair of aphorisms concerns gratitude. La Rochefoucauld's
298th maxim is: "La reconnaissance de la plupart des hommes n'est
qu'une secrete envie de recevoir de plus grands bienfaits."
Nietzsche writes in his 44th aphorism:
Danlcbarlceit und Rache.-Der Grund, weshalb der Machtige dankbar
ist, ist dieser. Sein Wohltater hat sich durch seine Wobltat an der
Sphare des Machtigcn gleichsam vergriffcn und sich in sie cinge
drangt: nun vergreift er sich zur Vergeltung wieder an der Sphare des
Wohltaters durcb den Akt dcr Dankbarkeit. Es ist eine mildcre Form
der Rache. Ohne die Genugtuung der Dankbarkeit zu haben, wiirde
der Machtige sich unmachtig gezeigt haben und fiirderhin dafiir
gelten. Deshalb stellt jede Gesellschaft der Guten, das beisst ur
spriinglich der Machtigen, die Dankbarkeit unter die ersten Pflichten.
-Swift hat den Satz hingeworfen, dass Menschen in demselben
Verhii.ltnis dankbar sind, wie sie Rache hegen.

Although La Rochefoucauld's work includes passages longer than
this maxim and Nietzsche's work has many aphorisms shorter in
length, both examples are typical of their authors. La Rochefoucauld's
519 aphorisms rarely exceed two sentences, although he did set a
long aphorism on self-love at the beginning of his first edition of the
Maximes. Approximately one quarter of Nietzsche's work is made up
of one-liners, but in a later work like Jenseits von Gut und Bose he
confines these to a separate section (Part 4) called "Spriiche und
Zwischenspiele." His preferred length is the short paragraph, as in the
above aphorism. To use traditional terminology, La Rochefoucauld
prefers the paradoxical aphorism, whereas Nietzsche prefers the dis
cursive aphorism in the tradition of Hippocrates and Bacon. Or, as
Franz Mautner formulates it, 4 La Rochefoucauld's aphorisms are
constructed on the principle of "Einfall," that is, the simulation in
one pithy statement of an inspired idea, whereas Nietzsche's more
often grow from the principle of "Klarung," that is, the intention to
clarify and lay out a matter in a definitive, satisfying way. (In Men
schHches Allzumenschliches, it is also characteristic of Nietzsche to
include at the end of his paragraphs a summary sentence that could
almost stand by itself as an aphorism of "Einfall": for example, after
a paragraph about our dubious knowledge of any metaphysical
world, Nietzsche writes (Aph. 9): "Ware die Existenz einer solchen
Welt noch so gut bewiesen, so stiinde doch fest, dass die gleichgiil
tigste aller Erkenntnisse eben ihre Erkenntnis ware : noch gleichgiil-
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tiger als dem Schiffer in Sturmesgefahr die Erkenntnis von der
chemischen Analysis des Wassers sein muss."; or, after a paragraph
on social justice (Aph. 451): "Wenn man der Bestie blutige Fleisch
stucke aus der Nahe zeigt und wieder wegzieht, his sie endlich
briillt; meint ihr, dass dies Gebriill Gerechtigkeit bedeute?")
But to return to the subject at hand: In addition to differences of
length in these two aphorisms there is the different explanation for
gratitude offered by each writer. As always, both authors are dis
abusing us of our illusions: in this case, that gratitude is as pure, self
less, or straightforward as it would seem. But La Rochefoucauld
emphasizes in gratitude the human desire to be self-seeking, to
advance oneself, as by flattery. Egoism (l'amour-propre) is at the
root of La Rochefoucauld's psychology of man, and gratitude is one
manifestation of it, a means to use others to gain one's advantage.
In other aphorisms about gratitude, he likens it to a kind of money,
paid in the hope of making better loans in the future (223); or he
stresses the role of pride in agreeing on the price of the transaction
(225 ). La Rochefoucauld's life as an aristocrat close to the court
of Louis XIV is surely part of the reason for this particular psy
chological insight into gratitude.
Like La Rochefoucauld, Nietzsche is exposing a secret reason
for gratitude; he does not accept it at face value, but seeks a psycho
logical explanation more true than the obvious one. But his meta
phor is derived neither from the search to find favor with a monarch
nor from commercial trading. Nor is self-love or pride particularly
salient here. Rather Nietzsche, in an anticipation of his theory of
the will to power, uses territorial metaphors of attack, of power
struggles, to interpret what we call gratitude. The powerful man has
been weakened by a kindness. By his gratitude he avenges himself on
his benefactor, showing his own power and thus demonstrating that
gratitude and revenge-normally conceived as opposites-are fun
damentally similar.
This is not only an example of the paradoxical element in the
aphorisms of both writers (gratitude"" greed, gratitude= revenge),
but it is also an example of the new monistic tendency in Nietzsche's
philsophy, which resists dualistic explanations, seeking rather in both
metaphysical and moral terms a monistic description of human
behavior.
Other of Nietzsche's aphorisms dealing with gratitude likewise
conceive it in terms of weak and strong, of nobility of nature rather
than of egoism per se. Tabling the question of the influence of a
Bismarckian Zeitgeist on his analyses, we can at least speculate
that such a psychology of gratitude may be partially attributed to
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Nietzsche's conception of his own life as struggle, a struggle with
himself, with his illness, with his contemporaries. Overcoming (an
assertion of power) is at the root of much of his philosophy, and
all is examined in this light. Characteristic in this regard is how
Nietzsche improves La Rochefoucauld in his 50th aphorism. La
Rochefoucauld had analyzed people's need for pity as their "stu
pidity" in a misfortune. But Nietzsche sees pity as more than mere
stupidity: it is a covert use of power, the power to make others feel
bad, the power to hurt. This interpretation is especially significant, as
it refutes Schopenhauer's exaltation of pity as the highest moral
feeling.
Nietzsche's aphorism is also distinguished from La Rochefoucauld's
by its historical orientation. In the phrase "jeder Gesellschaft der
Guten, das heisst urspriinglich der Machtigen," there is an indication
of Nietzsche's invariable genealogical approach to subjects under
investigation, whether metaphysical, religious, aesthetic, or moral.
This historical approach both goes beyond La Rochefoucauld's,
which never concerns itself with life outside its particular time, place,
and society; and at the same time it exposes the false universality
of La Rochefoucauld's apodictic statements by insisting on the evo
lution of every kind of behavior or conviction. When we read La
Rochefoucauld, we seem to be in a universe of eternal cubbyholed
qualities, vices and virtues. As La Bruyere described them, La Roche
foucauld's maxims seem to be "des lois dans Ia morale." 5 No allow
ance is ever made for diversity or change due to social class, histori
cal period, or geography. True, he uses phrases like "n'est souvent
que" and "Ia plupart des hommes" to qualify his assertions and allow
for deviation from his norm. But no reader remembers the quibble:
his aphorisms preclude argument; they have the ring of the absolute.
Who will ever remember that gratitude is greedy ambition in "Ia
plupart des hommes" and consider seriously that minority for whom
it is not? In tracing the evolution of our world in his discursive
aphorisms, Nietzsche undercuts this closed, irrefutable impact of the
aphoristic form as La Rochefoucauld uses it.
As a related example of this phenomenon, we may consider
another pair of aphorisms, this one concerning self-deception. La
Rochefoucauld writes: "Nous sommes si accoutumes nous deguiser
aux autres qu'enfin nous nous deguisons nous memes" (119). This
again has the ring of the absolute. Our deception of others by assum
ing disguises goes so far that it ultimately includes self-deception
and we keep our true nature even from ourselves. Such a thought
assumes that there is a "real nature," but one which remains unknown
to the subject in question. A similar aphorism states: "Dans toutes

a
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les professions chacun affecte une mine et un exterieur pour paraitre
ce qu'il veut qu'on le croie. Ainsi on peut dire que le monde n'est
compose que de mines" (256).
These thoughts may at first seem downright Nietzschean. Nietz
sches love of masks has been well documented; as a writer he likes to
assume various personae to carry his ideas forward. But in Men
schliches Allzumenschliches Nietzsche writes of self-deception in the
following manner:
Wie der Schein zum Sein wird.-Der Schauspieler kann zuletzt auch
beim ticfsten Schmerz nicht aufhoren, an den Eindruck seiner
Person und den gesamten szenischen Effekt zu denken, zum Beispiel
selbst beim Begrabn~~ seines K.indes; er wird iiber seinen eigenen
Schmerz und dessen Ausserungen weinen, als sein eigener Zuschauer.
Der Heuchler, welcher immer ein und dieselbe Rolle spielt, hort
zuletzt auf, Heuchler zu sein; zum Beispiel Priester, welche als junge
Manner gewohnlich bewusst oder unbewusst Heuchler sind, werden
zuletzt natiirlich und sind dann wirklich, ohne aile Affektation,
eben Priester; oder wenn es der Vater nicht soweit bringt, dann
vielleicht der Sohn, der des Vaters Vorsprung benutzt, seine Ge
wohnung erbt. Wenn einer sehr lange und hartnackig etwas scheinen
will, so wird es ihm zuletzt schwer, etwas anderes zu sein. Der Beruf
fast jedes Menschen, sogar des Kiinstlers, beginnt mit Heuchelei,
mit einem Nachmachen von aussen her, mit einem Kopieren des
Wirkungsvollen. Der, welcher immer die Maske freundlicher Mienen
tragt, muss zuletzi eine Gewalt iiber wohlwollende Stimmungen
bekommen, ohne welche der Ausdruck der Freundlichkeit nicht zu
erzwingen ist,-und zuletzt wieder bekomrnen diese iiber ihn Gewalt,
er ist wohlwoltend. (Aph. 51)

Here the aphorism is not launched from the premise of a fixed,
incontrovertible "real nature" which disguises itself from itself.
Nietzsche's relativism is evident in this aphorism, for seeming actu
ally becomes being. The external is all there is; the present is the
result of an evolution and is itself in flux. (In the fourth section of
Menschliches Allzumenschliches art too is seen as a process, rather
than as an unchanging product of perfection.) We might say that
Nietzsche's paradoxical conviction goes even deeper than La Roche
foucauld's: the phenomenon is the noumenon.
In yet another sense as well, La Rochefoucauld tills the ground
where Nietzsche will plant new seeds. La Rochefoucauld's psycho
logically penetrating, but ultimately neutral or pessimistic vision of
the human condition does acknowledge that ideal virtue, true love,
true friendship might exist, but the overwhelming force of the collec
tion is that the world is a place where amour-propre dominates,
where commerce and self interest are the chief motivations and kind-

FABER

213

ness, generosity, humility, and all the other so-called virtues are in
actuality (and regrettably) means to further one's own interest. The
attributes of civility and self-knowledge are all that remain unscathed.
Egoism, in short, is at the center of all human activity. His last aphor
ism, longer than any of the others in the collection, concerns death
and the inability of anyone in society to despise it truly. As a briefer
aphorism states: "Le solei} ni Ia mort ne se peuvent regarder fixe
ment" (26). By concluding with this long aphorism on death, he
gives his collection a decidedly nihilistic cast.
Just as our reading of Nietzsche has been altered by virtue of our
knowledge of the subsequent thought of Sigmund Freud, so our
reading of La Rochefoucauld changes with our knowledge of Nietz
sche.6 La Rochefoucauld's egoism becomes the springboard for
Nietzsche's idea of the will to power. In this reaction, Nietzsche
accepts La Rochefoucauld's insight, but does not draw the same pes
simistic or nihilistic conclusions. For Nietzsche's aim is not to
destroy (despite his reputation as the philosopher with a hammer);
even in Menschl£ches Allzumenschliches, his most negating work, he
insists on using the aphorism to create a new set of hierarchies to
accommodate the small, humble truths of human behavior which he
has discovered. In this sense, the fifth and central section of the
volume concerns the free spirit, one who takes from out of his criti
cal perspective a positive attitude, who "dem Herkommen entgegen
eine ganz individuelle Erkenntnis der Welt zu erwerben trachtet"
(Ap. 230).
Why must La Rochefoucauld's insights about egoism be a source
of dismay? If analysis of human interaction shows that a balance of
strength is more at its root, then let us affirm that strength, affirm
egoism. Or, to cite another example, what for La Rochefoucauld are
the "passions," continually betraying man's reason and leading him
to goals he had not been able to fore see with his intelligence, become
in Nietzsche that Dionysian element in art and society, one that
Nietzsche champions. In this connection, Nietzsche himself com
ments on his development of the thought of La Rochefoucauld,
writing in Der Wille zur Macht: "ihm entgegen suchte ich zunachst zu
beweisen, dass es gar nichts anderes geben konne als Egoismus." 7
Elsewhere, he calls La Rochefoucauld's attitude "Selbstverkleiner
ung,"8 again rebuking the melancholy aristocrat for unduly low
self-esteem.
So, for example, when both Nietzsche and La Rochefoucauld
agree on the dubious nature of pity, as described above, La Roche
foucauld will leave it at that. But Nietzsche will go further, taking up
La Rochefoucauld's insight and setting it in a positive light, in Aphor-
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ism 499, for example, where he states: "Mitfreude, nicht Mitleiden
macht den Freund." If La Rochefoucauld describes friendship as a
"commerce ou l'amour propre se propose toujours quelque chose
gagner," (83) Nietzsche in Aphorism 376 again goes further, writing
"Indem wir uns selbst erkennen und unser Wesen selber als eine
wandelnde Sphare der Meinungen und Stimmungen ansehen, und
somit ein wenig geringschatzen lernen, bringen wir uns wieder ins
Gleichgewicht mit den iibrigen.... Und so wollen wires miteinander
aushalten, da wir es ja mit uns aushalten.... Feinde, es gibt keinen
Feind.... "
We see then in La Rochefoucauld a step in the direction of that
proposed intellectual liberation described in Also sprach Zarathustra
as the three transformations of the spirit. La Rochefoucauld, we
might say, is ready to achieve the freedom of the lion, but never
goes that far; he does not affirm the negative truths he has discovered.
Why not? La Rochefoucauld makes no attempt to use his aphor
isms as other than a collection of apen;:us. As Jean Starobinski writes,
"C'est n'est pas une morale en systeme." 9 We have after reading
them a portrat"t of man and his society, or, to return to Nietzsche's
image, a series of cameo portraits, and that is the end of it. But in
reading Nietzsche one has the feeling, even from the beginning in this
first emancipatory collection, Menschliches Allzumenschliches, that
the aphorisms are not there simply to paint a portrait: rather-for all
his rejection of systems, metaphysical or moral-one has the feeling
that Nietzsche's aphorisms are in the service of a theory of man. And
in fact later aphoristic works do indeed pile stone upon stone in the
service of a theory fully-if cryptically-articulated in that aphor
istic-oracular work Also sprach Zarathustra.
Thus the metamorphosis in the content of the two aphorists does
not merely refer back to their particular intellectual historical ori
entation in time and place, but also reflects that for each, the aphor
ism is the means to a different end.
In closing I would like to consider more specifically Nietzsche's
adoption of the French aphorism in terms of style. The following
pair of aphorisms on the same theme is an instance of Nietzsche's
close emulation of his model.
La Rochefoucauld: "La parfaite valeur est de faire sans temoins ce
qu'on serait capable de faire devant toutle monde." (216)
Nietzsche: "Man springt einem Menschen, der ins Wasser fallt,
noch einmal so gem nach, wenn Leute zugegen sind, die es nicht
wagen." (Aph. 325)
What strikes us first about La Rochefoucauld's aphorism is its
balanced construction: "de faire sans temoins" is balanced by "de
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fa:ire devant toutle monde." This polar structure is intensified by the
extreme contrast of "sans temoins" and "tout le monde" (by writing
not just "un autre" or "des autres," but "toutle monde," La Roche
foucauld emphasizes the grand spectacle involved in the second form
of action). In addition, that world of absolute but inaccessible vir
tue which we discussed earlier in regard to the maxim concerning
self-deception is also evident here, for the implication is that perfect
bravery might exist, but no one actually does without witnesses that
which the presence of witnesses makes hypothetically possible. Con
tinuing the paradoxical thought, mere bravery equals lack of bravery
equals exhibitionism. In formulating his observation as a definition,
La Rochefoucauld reveals that the language of the absolute in the
everyday world is empty of meaning. (Other such examples: love of
justice (78), gratitude (298), moderation (293), and liberality (263).
Nietzsche's aphorism also has a polar structure, but the thought,
although it is essentially the same thought, is not couched as a defi
nition. It is more of a comparison, again more relativistic. Neither is
this aphorism as abstract as La Rochefoucauld's: rather than defining
"perfect bravery," Nietzsche gives a quasi-anecdotal example. This is
generally true in Nietzsche, who is not out to write an anatomy of
any kind and who avoids the closed nature of definition. Instead, his
aphorism shows a more visual use of language. Although it is usually
the German philosophers who encourage us to consider abstract
words as having an almost concrete presence (Geist, Freiheit, Freude
march forward through German philosophy), here it is La Roche
foucauld who, as Starobinski writes, makes of abstractions "des
acteurs independents, de petits personnages," 10 entities with lives
of their own. So strong is this tendency that La Rochefoucauld can
write: "Quand les vices nous quittent, nous nous flattons de la
creance que c'est nous qui les quittons" (192). The vices and virtues
seem to exist apart from the subject itself.
La Rochefoucauld's abstract language is also extremely constrained
in its use of metaphor. A conventional word or two generally suf
fices: death is like the sun (26), fortune is like light (380), the river
of virtue ends in the sea of self-interest (171). The seventeenth cen
tury classicist does not go far afield to color his writing. In Nietzsche's
aphorisms, images are more daring: flattery can be a sleeping potion
(318), people are like corks on the surface of a wave (627); the man
of action is like a waterfall (488); people are like piles of charcoal
in the forest (585 ). Reading in retrospect again, we see that it is
Nietzsche the precursor of the Expressionist poets who introduces to
the aphorism a palette of color that of course would have been con
sidered vulgar in seventeenth century France.
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When Nietzsche tries to write paradoxical aphorisms like Roche
foucauld's they often fall flat, whereas La Rochefoucauld's rarely do.
Our previous pair of aphorisms illustrates this point to some degree,
La Rochefoucauld's being more succinct in expressing the same
thought. Or:
Nietzsche on marriage: "Einige Manner haben iiber die Entfiihrung
ihrer Frauen geseufzt, die meisten dariiber, dass niemand sie ihnen
entfiihren wollte." (Aph. 388)
La Rochefoucauld on the same topic: "II y a de bons mariages,
mais il n'y en point de deiicieux." (113)
If within the context of German humor Nietzsche's aphorism actu
ally does seem witty (bad taste and misogyny acknowledged, but dis
regarded for the moment), it is still clumsy and laboriously phrased
compared with the graceful brevity of La Rochefoucauld's, whose
entire wit rests on the one word "de!icieux," used to its fullest
possible effect.
In terms of style, then, Nietzsche's brilliance as an aphorist does
not shine forth when he emulates La Rochefoucauld's paradoxical
aphorisms most closely. However, to say this is a flaw is to say that
El Greco would be found wanting if he tried to be Paul Klee. It is
Nietzsche's expansion of the genre that makes his aphoristic writing
significant. We have already seen how he uses the genre to present a
psychology of man in an authentic form, incorporating in addition to
his historical perspective a broader use of metaphor. Nietzsche also
widens the range of the aphorism to include subjects never con
sidered by La Rochefoucauld. In Menschliches Allzumenschliches
alone, there are in addition to the moral and social realms that fur
nished our examples, sections on metaphysics, art, religion, and
politics. Furthermore, the cynical tone of La Rochefoucauld's aphor
isms rarely if ever changes, but Nietzsche varies that tone with
pathos, anecdote, and confession. Unlike La Rochefoucauld, he also
allows the genre to include the dialectical, allows argument. Where
La Rochefoucauld twists a knife, Nietzsche hammers at the nailhead
until it is firmly lodged.
Nietzsche's emulation of La Rochefoucauld's aphorisms in Men
schliches Allzumenschliches starts him on his way, but his is a dif
ferent way, that of a philosopher, not a moraliste, a poet, not an
ecrivain, an apologist, not an aphorist. He cannot stay put at La
Rochefoucauld's aphorism, but molds and expands it until it becomes
the vessel of his thought, a thought that likewise does not stay put
at the devastating aperc;u, but goes on to question and explore,
argue and conclude.
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